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josh@hbs.eduThe significance of financial innovation is widely recognized.  Many leading 
scholars, including Miller (1986) and Merton (1992), have highlighted the importance of 
new products and services in the financial arena.  Empirically, Tufano (1989) showed 
that of all public offerings in 1987, 18% (on a dollar-weighted basis) consisted of 
securities that had not been in existence in 1974.  These innovations are not just critical 
for firms in the financial services industry, but also impact other companies: for instance, 
enabling them to raise capital in larger amounts and at a lower cost than they could 
otherwise.  
 
Yet despite this importance, the sources of financial innovation remain 
surprisingly poorly understood.  In a recent review article, Frame and White (2003) 
highlight the paucity of empirical research in this area.  While innovation in 
manufacturing industries has inspired literally thousands of academic studies, the authors 
are only able to identify 39 empirical studies of financial innovation.  Moreover, this 
literature is highly concentrated on the “back end” of the innovation process, focusing 
largely on the diffusion of these innovations, the characteristics of the innovation 
adopters, and the consequences of innovation for firm profitability and social welfare.  
The authors can only identify two papers on the origins of innovation, Ben-Horim and 
Silber (1977) and Lerner (2002).  This paucity of research can be contrasted with the 
abundant literature on the sources of manufacturing innovation. 
 
This paucity of research is particularly puzzling given the likelihood that the 
dynamics of financial innovation are quite different from that in manufacturing.  The   2
financial services industry has historically differed substantially from the bulk of 
manufacturing industries in regard to the ability of innovators to appropriate their 
discoveries.  Until recently, firms have been very limited in their ability to protect new 
ideas through patents.  As a result, new product ideas have diffused rapidly across 
competitors (Tufano (1989)).  Second, product innovations have been typically subject to 
a great deal of exposure, due to the need to market these products to potential customers 
and (frequently) to file documentation with public regulatory agencies.  Third, firms in 
many segments of the financial services industry frequently engage in collaborative 
activities, whether syndications of particular innovations or collaborations to market new 
products.  Such collaborations—while certainly also seen in manufacturing industries—
may shape the incentives to innovate and nature of innovations.  Together, these 
considerations suggest the need to examine financial innovation as a phenomenon in its 
own right.  
 
As Frame and White point out, one of the major barriers to the study of financial 
innovation has been a paucity of data.  Studies of manufacturing innovation have 
traditionally focused on R&D spending and patenting.  Given the rareness with which 
financial service firms report R&D sending and the infrequency of financial patents until 
recently, these measures are unlikely to be satisfactory.  This paper seeks to take a first 
step towards addressing this gap, by developing a measure of financial innovation based 
on news stories in the Wall Street Journal.   
   3
The analysis proceeds in two parts.  First, I explore the economic characteristics 
that are associated with financial innovation, seeking to test a number of hypotheses 
suggested by the innovation literature.  The second part examines one specific regulatory 
change, the State Street decision of the late 1990s.  While financial patents were awarded 
prior to the late 1990s, this litigation dramatically changed the financial service firms’ 
perception of the validity and value of these awards.  (See Appendix A for a discussion of 
this case and its implications.)  I examine whether this change in appropriability 
conditions has affected the type of firms pursuing innovations. 
 
Several conclusions emerge from the analysis: 
•  Contrary to representations in the earlier literature, financial innovation has been 
characterized by an even participation of firms across the size spectrum, or even a 
disproportionate representation of smaller firms.  More specifically, a doubling in 
firm size is associated with less than a doubling in innovations generated in most 
regression specifications. 
•  Firms that are less profitable in their respective sectors are disproportionately 
innovative.  This result is consistent, for instance, with depictions by Silber (1975, 
1983). 
•  While little evidence exists of firms translating localized knowledge spillovers 
from their peers into more innovations, firm with ties to academic institutions 
appear to be disproportionately more innovative. 
•  The years since the State Street decision are characterized by an increased 
domination of innovation by large firms.  The elasticity of innovation with respect   4
to size has increased sharply in this period.  Some evidence suggests that the 
academic connections may have declined in importance as a spur to innovation. 
•  This increasing role of larger firms in innovation does not appear to be a 
consequence of who is filing for patents, which mirrors the population of 
innovators in many respects.  Other possible explanations include that the value of 
patent awards may differ for firms in different size classes, or that this shift is a 
consequence of an unrelated change in the economic or regulatory environment.  
Less academically connected firms appear to be more frequent patentees. 
 
 
Two limitations should be acknowledged at the outset.  First, the time span 
covered in this study is relatively limited, from 1990 to 2002.  This choice implies that 
the number of major regulatory and tax policy changes during the period under study was 
quite modest, and the identification of their consequences challenging.  Instead, I focus 
on exploring the impact of only one major change, the emergence of financial patenting 
in the late 1990s.  There is no reason, however, that this methodology could not be 
extended to a longer dataset, which would allow the more ready identification of these 
effects. 
 
The second limitation related to the methodology employed.  This paper focuses 
on developing a number of “stylized facts” about financial innovation.  While many of 
the studies of manufacturing innovation have proceeded in a similar manner, others (e.g., 
Kortum (1997)) have sought to develop structural models of patenting, productivity, and 
R&D.  Reflecting the early stage of the study of financial innovation and the lack of   5
many meaningful measures of innovative performance, a simpler approach seemed 
desirable. 
 
The organization of this paper is as follows.  Section 1 describes the hypotheses 
that will be tested in the paper.  The development of the dataset is summarized in Section 
2.  Section 3 presents the key patterns of financial sector innovation.  The changes around 




In this initial section, I outline the hypotheses that motivate the analysis.  I 
highlight the extent to which the analyses of financial innovation undertaken below have 
been anticipated in earlier theoretical and empirical work on manufacturing innovation. 
 
In the first analysis, I focus on three hypotheses regarding the determinants of 
differences in the innovation rate across firms.  These relate to the consequences of the 
firms’ competitive positions, capital constraints, and abilities to access knowledge 
spillovers.  In the second analysis, I examine how a change in the ability to protect 
discoveries affected innovation.  Each of these topics has been explored in the theoretical 
and empirical literature on manufacturing innovation, and some in the theoretical 
literature on financial innovation.  While this review is not intended to be exhaustive 
(Cohen (1995) provides a comprehensive overview of literature on manufacturing 
innovation, and Allen and Gale (1994) and Tufano (2003) on financial innovation), it can 
hopefully suggest the broad outlines of the literature.   6
 
Firm competitive position.  This literature has most frequently examined how 
firms’ rate of innovation varies with two aspects: their size and age.  The relationship 
between firm size and innovation has been a topic of enduring interest to economists at 
least since Schumpeter’s (1942) argument that large firms were the ideal manner in 
which to pursue innovation.
1  Whatever the advantages of small firms for insuring intense 
static price competition, he asserted, they were unlikely to have the incentives to engage 
in long-term R&D if much of the rents were likely to be subsequently competed away.   
 
While the empirical literature analyzing this question has been voluminous, few 
distinct conclusions have emerged.  An illustration of these frustrations can be seen by 
comparing the two most comprehensive studies in this literature, Bound, et al. (1984) and 
Cohen, Levin, and Mowery (1987).  While Bound and his co-authors found that R&D-
intensity was highest among very small and very large firms, the latter paper found that once 
industry effects were controlled for, R&D intensity did not change with firm size.  Acs and 
Audretsch (1988), using a database of articles about innovations, suggested that small firms 
disproportionately contribute to innovative activity. 
 
A number of theorists have suggested that younger firms may be more effective at 
introducing new products.  Holmstrom (1989) argued that the established corporation 
primarily exists to fulfill production and marketing goals and that to effectively pursue these 
goals it has to organize in a way that compromises incentives to innovate.  Providing 
                                                 
1This work has also inspired many cross-industry studies of how innovation at the 
industry level differs with market concentration.   7
incentives for both types of activities within one organization is more costly than providing 
them through separate organizations.  Aron and Lazear (1990) presented a model in which 
new firms pursue less risk-averse strategies and are hence more likely to undertake radical 
new research programs and to introduce new products. 
 
Prusa and Schmitz (1994) tested these theories by examining the introduction of 
new software products.  The authors suggested that new firms appear to be more effective 
at creating new software categories, while established firms have a comparative 
advantage in extending existing product lines.  Similar conclusions emerged from 
Henderson’s study of the photolithographic industry (1993), which suggested that 
established companies failed to successfully pursue major technological opportunities. 
 
The relationship between firm characteristics and innovation has not attracted a 
great deal of attention in the theoretical literature on financial innovation: much of the 
work has ignored the effects of financial institutions.  The works that have appeared are 
mixed in their conclusions.  Bhattacharyya and Nanda (2000) argued that investment 
banks with greater market power and more secure relationships with their customers are 
likely to innovate.  Silber (1975, 1983), on the other hand, argued that those firms that 
most constrained by market imperfections—which he implies will be the weakest and 
smallest firms—should be the most innovative.   
 
Financial constraints.  Another extensively scrutinized question has been the 
extent to which financial resources affects firms’ ability to pursue innovations.  Since   8
Arrow (1962), it has been understood that the substantial information problems 
surrounding R&D projects make it difficult to raise external capital to finance them.  As a 
result, firms with promising projects may be unable to pursue them.  This intuition is 
formalized in models such as Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and Myers and Majluf (1984). 
 
Many early studies suggested a relationship between cash flow and R&D 
spending, a finding that could be interpreted in various ways.  Recent works have 
examined these issues more systematically.  Himmelberg and Peterson (1994) looked at a 
panel of small firms, and showed that the sensitivity of R&D investments to cash flow 
seems to be considerably greater than that of physical investments.  But the bulk of the 
attention has focused on the impact of leverage on R&D spending.  Hall (1990) showed 
that firms that increase their leverage tend to reduce R&D spending.  Similar conclusions 
emerged from Greenwald, Salinger, and Stiglitz (1992). This topic has been little 
explored, however, in the theoretical literature on financial innovation. 
 
Ability to Access Knowledge Spillovers.  An extensive theoretical literature (e.g., 
Romer (1986)) has argued that spillovers of technological knowledge are an important 
spur to future innovation.  As Krugman (1991) and others have hypothesized, these 
spillovers—particularly of tacit knowledge—are likely to be geographically concentrated.    
 
Jaffe, Henderson, and Trajtenberg (1993) demonstrated that patents are more 
likely to be cited in patents awarded to other entities in the same region, an effect that 
they suggest is consistent with the localization of knowledge spillovers.  Similarly,   9
Audretsch and Feldman (1996) showed that not only is innovative activity more 
concentrated than manufacturing, but that this is particularly the case in industries where 
knowledge spillovers are important. 
 
Another source of spillovers may be ties to academic institutions.  Cohen and 
Levinthal (1989) hypothesized that firms may seek to build close connections to 
academia to boost their “absorptive capacity.” The authors hypothesize that these 
activities enhance firms’ abilities to interpret scientific discoveries and to translate them 
into innovations.  
 
 Some supporting evidence for these claims has been found in the life sciences.  
Henderson and Cockburn (1996) showed that pharmaceutical firms that embraced 
scientific-based research were particularly successful in developing new drugs.  In related 
work, they showed that other practices—such as co-authorship between corporate 
scientists and public sector researchers—are also associated with enhanced drug 
discovery.  Zucker, Darby, and Brewer (1998) demonstrated that the formation of new 
biotechnology firms in regions is largely driven by the presence of academic science.  
The impact of knowledge spillovers on innovation in the financial services industry has 
been little scrutinized, from either a theoretical or an empirical perspective. 
 
Appropriability.  Beginning with Nordhaus (1969), much of the theoretical 
economics literature has assumed an unambiguous relationship between the strength of 
patent protection and the rate of innovation: an increase in the amount of patent   10
protection offered should increase the rate of innovation.  A crucial assumption behind 
such findings is that the nature of the patent award does not affect the incentives of 
subsequent researchers to pursue innovations. This assumption has been relaxed in a line 
of work on sequential innovation, beginning with Scotchmer and Green (1990).  When 
the nature of protection offered the initial innovator affects the incentives of subsequent 
researchers, the conclusions may change.  This literature suggests that strong patent 
protection may actually lead to significantly less innovation than no patent protection at 
all.  Gallini (1992) considered the impact of increasing patent protection when rivals can 
“invent around” previous discoveries (at some cost).  This model suggested that the 
relationship between patent strength and innovation will display an “inverted U” shape. 
 
This impact of appropriability conditions on innovation has attracted considerable 
empirical attention, but the results have been mixed (see Gallini (2002) for a review).  
Many studies of specific policy changes (e.g., Sakakibara and Branstetter’s (2001) study 
of the 1988 strengthening of patent protection in Japan) have proven to be inconclusive.  
This literature has also sought to assess what types of firms are likely to benefit from 
stronger patent protection.  Here too, a clear conclusion is elusive.  Hall and Ziedonis 
(2001) argued that the strengthening of patent protection in the U.S. over the past two 
decades harmed innovation by smaller firms in the semiconductor industry because they 
could not participate in the cross-licensing agreements that the major firms entered into.  
Merges (1996), on the other hand, argued that the strengthened intellectual property 
regime allowed small biotechnology firms to more readily attract venture capital 
financing and enter into alliances with pharmaceutical firms.    11
 
This issue, as well, has been little explored in the context of financial innovation.  
One exception is Herrera and Schroth (2002), who showed in a theoretical analysis that 
even when inventions cannot be patented, investment banks will have considerable 
incentives to develop new products. 
 
To be sure, the list of potential explanations for financial innovation that I will 
examine here is far from exhaustive.  The most important omission is demand side shifts, 
whose importance in spurring innovation was highlighted by Schmookler (1966).  For 
instance, the emergence of a new high-technology industry with particularly severe 
informational asymmetries may spark the introduction of new financial instruments 
geared to their particular needs.  Similarly, alterations to the tax code or regulations may 
stimulate corporations to demand new financial products and services.
2, 
3  I cannot really 
effectively capture these demand side shifts here, and so will ignore them.  To the extent 
to which they are correlated with the independent variables, these may introduce an 
omitted variables bias. 
 
                                                 
2The extensive theoretical literature examining these issues is reviewed by Harris and 
Raviv (1989) and Allen and Gale (1994).  For illustrations of financial innovation 
triggered by the special characteristics of the biotechnology industry, for instance, see 
Beatty, Berger, and Magliolo (1995) and Chacko, Tufano, and Vetter (2001). 
   
3It is unlikely, however, that tax policy shifts will affect the supply curve for innovations.  
Under the Internal Revenue Code § 41, the credit is limited to “research in the laboratory 
or for experimental purposes, undertaken for discovering information, technological in 
nature.”  In a series of decisions, tax courts have held that this definition does not include 
R&D performed by financial service institutions or involving software development more 
generally.  Recent examples include Tax & Accounting Software Corp. v. U.S., 301 F.3d 
1254 (10th Cir. 2002) and Eustace v. Commissioner, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 25530 (7th 
Cir. 2002).   12
2.  Developing the Data-Set 
As highlighted in the introduction, traditional measures of innovative activity—
e.g., R&D spending and patenting—are unlikely to be very illustrative in this setting.  An 
alternative measure is needed.  This section describes the manner in which I develop the 
database of financial innovations.   
 
 
A.  Identifying Innovations 
My goal is to examine financial innovation before and after the State Street 
decision.   This is a challenging task.  Not only are traditional approaches inadequate, but 
the listings of new securities compiled by Securities Data Company (which maintains the 
leading database of corporate new issues) are inadequate.  First, much of the innovation 
in financial services has taken place outside the realm of publicly traded securities, such 
as new Automatic Teller Machines and insurance products. Second, as Tufano (2003) 
points out, many of the “novel” securities identified in the SDC database are minor 
variants of existing securities, often promulgated by investment banks seeking to 
differentiate themselves from their peers.   
 
As a result, I need an alternative measure of innovative activity.  I employ an 
approach here—originally developed in Kortum and Lerner (2003)—of examining 
articles in the Wall Street Journal concerning financial invention or innovation.  I 
compile all such articles between 1990 and 2002 that related to new financial products, 
services, or institutions.  While such a measure is far less frequently used as a measure of 
innovation than R&D and patents, I am not the first to use counts of stories to study   13
innovations: Acs and Audretsch (1988), Chaney, Devinney, and Winer  (1991), and 
Cardinal and Opler (1995) are earlier examples.  The latter two papers use counts of 
stories exclusively from the Wall Street Journal.  Given the Journal’s intensive coverage 
of the financial services industry, the use of this measure seems particularly appropriate 
here. 
 
In order to undertake this analysis, it is critical to have a consistent definition of 
what constitutes an invention and an innovation.
4  According to the relevant definition in 
Webster’s Dictionary, an invention is “an original contrivance or apparatus,” while an 
innovation refers to the “introduction of something new.”  I take inventions to be new 
products or processes, while innovations refer to the first time an invention is put to use.  
I wish to count both. 
 
Even if I ignore the distinction between invention and innovation, in many cases 
either definition is too vague to be useful in deciding which entries to count.  To address 
this problem, first I define some terms which scholars have found useful for delineating 
what counts as an invention or innovation.  From this literature (e.g., Schmookler (1966) 
and Jewkes, Sawyers, and Stillerman (1969)), I can find definitions which are much more 
concrete than the dictionary's.  These authors make a distinction between scientific and 
                                                 
4The following six paragraphs are from Kortum and Lerner (2003).  Sam Kortum 
originally wrote the first three paragraphs.  A related concern was insuring consistent 
coding of the databases by the research assistants.  Before beginning working on the 
database, each research assistant coded the same test section.  The responses were 
compared to the author’s coding of this section.  When necessary, a second test section 
was coded as well.  Frequent team meetings discussed questionable cases and helped 
insure consistency.   14
technological knowledge, the former being a set of general principles while the latter is a 
set of specific techniques, products, and processes.  Scientific knowledge is expanded by 
discoveries about how the world works while technological knowledge expands via 
inventions.  I want to count inventions but not discoveries.
5 
 
Schmookler makes the critical distinction between innovation and imitation:  
When an enterprise produces a good or service or uses a method or input 
that is new to it, it makes a technical change.  The first enterprise to make 
a given technical change is an innovator.  Its action is innovation.  
Another enterprise making the same technical change later is presumably 
an imitator and its action, imitation (pg. 2, emphasis in the original).  
 
I do not want articles about imitation. Once invented, several firms can in principle use a 
technique at once without diminishing its performance.  Thus, I do not want to include 
articles about firms that are simply expanding production.  Some new products may be a 
direct consequence of scaling up production.  For example, as the number of investment 
bankers at financial institutions increases, it is obvious that more transactions can be 
underwritten.  Such behavior is simply expansion or replication of an existing production 
process.  I would, however, count a story about the bank's development of a new product. 
 
For the most part, I will not attempt to evaluate the importance of any invention or 
innovation, but will simply assume that if the Wall Street Journal finds it worth writing 
about it should be included.  I use the Wall Street Journal due both to the consistency in 
its editorial mission over the years and the thoroughness of its indexing, which should 
                                                 
5Scholars also distinguish between invention and development, the latter being concerned 
with getting an invention to work in practice.  I will not worry about this distinction (in 
the same way I want to include both inventions and innovations).   
   15
lead to fewer biases.  (The New York Times, for instance, launched a series of regional 
editions over the same period, and greatly enhanced their coverage of local news from 
outside the New York metropolitan area.)  The specific rules I use for including or 




I consider the individual article as the unit of observation.  I include multiple 
articles even if they concerned the same innovation.  I assume that articles about new 
products and services were in fact about innovations unless the article explicitly suggests 
otherwise.  In other words, I err on the side of including new products even if they might 
be imitations.   
 
One natural concern is that the fluctuations in stories about innovations in the 
Journal may have had little to do with any change in the fundamental innovativeness of 
the American financial services industry.  For instance, the State Street decision may 
have triggered firms to disclose more discoveries, since they no longer needed to rely as 
heavily on trade secrecy to protect ideas.  To address this concern, I coded the extent to 
which the stories unambiguously represented a true innovation.  I employed an 
(admittedly subjective) three-part classification scheme, denoting stories As, Bs, and Cs, 
depending on the extent to which I was sure that it described an innovative contribution.  
No evidence of changing quality appeared in the tabulations: for instance, between 1990 
                                                 
6One criterion in the appendices should be highlighted.  I focus on innovations in the 
United States, whether by a foreign or domestic firm.  I make this choice because I 
believe the Wall Street Journal’s coverage of U.S. innovations is much less likely to be 
affected by selection biases.  I also take this route because this measure is closely 
analogous to the U.S. patents analyzed below (which can be applied for by any entity, 
foreign or domestic, but only cover the United States).     16
and 1998, 69.9% of the stories were classified as either an “A” or a “B.”  After the State 
Street decision (between 2000 and 2002), 68.5% of the stories were so classified.  
 
I also talked with a current and former reporter of the Wall Street Journal in order 
to understand biases that may have been at work in the selection of stories.  They 
highlighted two issues, which may make small firms appear more or less innovative than 
they actually are.  First, lacking the distribution networks of established firms, small 
financial institutions may have more aggressively sought publicity for their discoveries.  
Second, the Wall Street Journal pays particular attention to the largest financial 
institutions, often assigning dedicated reporters to cover these firms.  This intense 
coverage might have led to more articles about innovations by larger firms.  They also 
noted that a significant—though difficult to ascertain—number of innovations never 
make it into the Journal: for instance, the development of a new pricing methodology for 
mortgage-backed securities by the proprietary trading group of an investment bank or a 
hedge fund is unlikely to be publicized. 
 
I identify stories between 1990 and 2002 using two sources.  The Wall Street 
Journal Index (WSJI) is a printed volume with at least one entry for each article in the 
Wall Street Journal.  In any given year, the entries in the WSJI are organized by topic.  
The same article may appear more than once as it may relate to more than one topic.  
Each WSJI entry contains a short summary of the article from which one can evaluate 
whether the article concerned an invention or innovation.  Unfortunately, the length and 
detail of these summaries deteriorated over the 1990s, as most readers began relying on   17
on-line sources.  As a result, I also identify stories through a second source, the Factiva 
database.  I search this database using a large number of keywords associated with new 
discoveries or product or service introductions.   
 
I combine the stories from both sources to construct the database.  In each case, I 
identify the entities featured in the story.  In some cases, articles list large numbers of 
firms (e.g., a review article recapping a set of innovations).  In these cases, I identify only 
the four entities most prominently featured in the story, based on the number of words 
devoted to each entity in the original article.  (In case of ties, I employ the entities 
mentioned earliest in the article.)  In some cases, these entities included government 
bodies (e.g., “World Bank issues novel security,” “Commodities Future and Trading 
Commission approves new derivative contract”), exchanges, and other non-profit 
organizations.  
 
Table 1 summarizes the distribution of articles and entities in the dataset.  Panel A 
summarizes the distribution of the 651 news stories meeting our criteria.  No clear time 
trend is evident from the data.  Panel B presents a breakdown of the types of innovations 
reported on.  The bulk of the stories relate to the underwriting of novel securities or 
trading technology (33.5%), asset management (26.2%), and retail banking or mortgages 
(11.6%).  Panel C shows the breakdown of stories over time, now focusing solely on the 
387 stories about entities that listed in Compustat (as discussed below, I will focus on this 
subset of firms).  The final panel shows the breakdown of the industry of the innovators, 
by three-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code.  Not surprisingly, the three   18
most common classes are classified among “finance, insurance, and real estate”: 
securities brokers and dealers (23.5%), commercial banks (22.3%), and other non-
depository credit institutions (8.2%).  Following these categories, however, are a wide 
variety of industries, ranging from computer programming to publishers to motor vehicle 
manufacturers. 
 
I assess the importance of these announcements by examining the market reaction 
to these stories.   In all, there are 305 distinct dates on which stories appear about entities 
whose stock price is included in the databases of the Center for Research in Security 
Prices.  (In some cases, Compustat-listed firms are not found in CRSP; in others, multiple 
stories about innovations at a single firm appear within one week of each other.
7)  The 
firms' equity returns around the time of the Wall Street Journal story are consistently 
positive and statistically significant.  For instance, when I estimate a market model using 
a (-1, +1) window centered on the date the story appeared, the average cumulative 
abnormal return is +0.63% and the associated t-statistic is 2.68.  (The result is significant 
at the one-percent level using a one-sided t-test.)  (All observations must have at least 
three observations between one and twelve months before or after the event window, 
which is used to compute the correlation with the market.  The value-weighted CRSP 
index is used as a benchmark.)  The results are similar when I use longer or shorter 
windows, alternative indexes, or different specifications.  For instance, when I estimate a 
market-adjusted model over the (-2, +1) window, the average cumulative abnormal return 
                                                 
7When multiple stories appear about a company within five trading days of each other, I 
only employ the first observation.  The results are robust to using the latter observation or 
deleting these overlapping observations entirely.   19
is +0.84% with an associated t-statistic of 3.04.  These results suggest that the 
innovations are indeed significant ones to the firms in the sample. 
 
B.   Supplementary Data 
In addition to the database of innovations, I collect a variety of additional 
information.  These come from three sources: databases derived from U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission filings, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s (PTO) on-line 
patent database, and academic-practitioner finance journals. 
 
In order to effectively characterize the firms, I focus on only those firms that are 
contained in the Compustat database.  This decision means that a variety of entries are 
excluded, including government agencies, non-profit organizations, and private entities 
that are not publicly traded (e.g., Fidelity Investments and Visa).  Nonetheless, this 
choice is the only way to insure a consistent set of variables to analyze. 
 
Each entry is assigned the Compustat identifier associated with the firm at the 
time of the innovation.  These assignments are not always apparent, but can be 
determined by reviewing the corporations’ history using the Hoover’s directory, Lexis-
Nexis, the SDC Mergers and Acquisitions database, and on-line searches.  Thus, for 
instance, an innovation by Wachovia Bank in 1999 would be assigned to Compustat 
GVKEY 11247 (denoted “Wachovia Corp-Old”), while one by First Union Bank in that 
year would be assigned to GVKEY 4739 (denoted “Wachovia Corp,” reflecting the fact 
that First Union acquired Wachovia in 2001 and assumed its name).  In some cases,   20
Compustat has multiple listings for a single firm (typically when a firm has a highly 
visible subsidiary or a tracking stock, but also when the firm releases “pro forma” 
earnings in addition to those computed in a standard manner).  In these cases, I assign the 
innovation to the record of the parent firm that uses the standard definition of earnings.  I 
drop the other records associated with the firm from the analysis. 
 
I download from Compustat a wide variety of financial data on all firms with at 
least one Wall Street Journal innovation and all firms with a primary assignment to 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes 60 through 64 and 67.  The choice of these 
industries is driven by the SIC scheme: I included all firms in “Finance, Insurance and 
Real Estate” except for SIC class 65, which contains real estate operators.  Very few 
innovations were associated with SICs 673 and 6798, “Trusts” and “Real Estate 
Investment Trusts.”  In diagnostic regressions discussed below, I repeat the analysis 
below without these categories.
8  
 
The second source is the records of the PTO.  The PTO has an on-line database 
that summarizes all patents awarded since 1976.  Following the procedure in Lerner 
(2002), I identify all patents assigned to relevant U.S. Patent Classification subclasses.  I 
use a somewhat broader set of patent subclasses than that paper for two reasons.  First, 
because the innovations database includes a broad array of bank and insurance 
                                                 
8I also use other sources to supplement Compustat for one measure: the time the firm has 
been publicly traded, a measure that is frequently incomplete in Compustat.  If missing, I 
use the date of the IPO as reported in the SDC Corporate New Issues database.  If not 
included here, I use the first date the firm in which was listed in CRSP or Datastream.   
As a result, the earliest firms are listed as going public in December 1925.   21
innovations, I wish to be sure that all relevant patents are captured.  Second, the PTO 
initiated in 2000 a “second review” of patent applications in class 705, in which many of 
the most controversial Internet-related patents were classified.  Since this date, there has 
been a tendency of applicants to seek to get their financial applications classified in Class 
902.  I employ all patents with a primary assignment to subclasses 705/4, 705/35 through 
705/45, and 902/1 through 902/41. 
 
In all, I identify 1969 patents awarded between 1990 and 2002 and the entity to 
which the patent was assigned (if any).  I once again code these with the appropriate 
Compustat firm identifier, following the procedure outlined above.  There are 922 distinct 
assignee-patent pairs where the assignee is listed in Compustat. 
 
Table 2 summarizes the innovators and patentees most frequently found in the 
databases.  Panel A, which summarizes the distribution of innovators, highlights the 
frequency of stories about some of the largest financial institutions.  The two most 
frequent innovators, Merrill Lynch and Citigroup, also appear on the list of leading 
patentees.  Information technology firms and data vendors dominate the list of patentees.  
Two of these firms, IBM and Reuters, also appear on the list of financial innovators. 
 
The third source is academic-practitioner finance journals.  I want to characterize 
the extent to which each firm is close to the academic frontier.  I employ a proxy similar 
to that in Lerner (2002): the firm’s representation on the editorial boards of four leading   22
academic-practitioner journals.
9  I calculate each firm’s editorial board seats at the 
beginning of each year.  I count a firm that is a sponsor of a journal as having the 
equivalent of two editorial board seats.  While this proxy is undoubtedly crude (the 
overwhelming majority of institutions never serve on such boards, even if they may have 
academic contacts in other ways), it nonetheless appears to at least roughly identify many 
firms that have strong academic ties. 
 
3.  The Origins of Financial Innovations 
I now turn to understanding how my measure of financial innovation relates to the 
characteristics of the potential innovators.  I first perform some cross-tabulations, and 
then undertake a series of regression analyses. 
 
Table 3 compares the features of all Wall Street Journal innovators with all firms 
with a primary assignment to the financial services industry.  Each firm-year pair is used 
as a distinct observation (and assumed to be independent).  Inspired by the discussion in 
Section 2 above, I examine the firms along several dimensions: 
•  Total assets.  I use assets (rather than employees or revenues) for several reasons.  
The measure is more frequently available in Compustat than employees: using assets 
rather than employees increases the sample size by 56%.  I also believe it better 
conveys the scale of activity for many institutions which may have considerable 
                                                 
9The journals employed were Financial Analysts Journal, Financial Management, the 
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, and the Journal of Portfolio Management.  These 
journals were selected using a variety of sources, including Alexander and Marby (1994), 
McNulty and Boekeloo (1999), and various on-line compilations by the Institute for 
Scientific Information.   23
resources under management, but may have a relatively modest number of employees 
or revenue flows from fees.  Assets are in millions of 2002 dollars. 
•  Time the firm has been publicly traded.  While ideally I would have a measure of the 
firm’s overall age, this is a frequently used proxy. 
•  Profitability of the firm.  I wish to capture a measure of relative profitability that is 
unaffected by capital structure choices.  Thus, I use the ratio of earnings before 
interest, debt, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) to total revenues. 
•  Leverage. I employ the ratio of the book value of the firm’s long-term debt to total 
capitalization (the book value of its long-term debt and preferred stock plus the 
market value of its common stock). 
•  Other financial firms in zip code.  In order to capture the presence of localized 
spillovers, I compute the number of other financial service firms with a headquarters 
in the same zip code as the firm in the year of the observation. 
•  Financial innovations in zip code.  One possibility suggested by the literature is that 
spillovers are particularly likely from innovative firms in the same locality.  I thus 
compile the count of the total number of financial innovations in the same year by 
firms with a headquarters in the same zip code as the firm.  This measure is highly 
correlated with the count of other financial firms, so I only use one of the variables in 
the regression at any time.
10 
•  The ratio of editorial board seats to assets.  I compute the total number of editorial 
board seats of and editorial sponsorships by each financial institution in a given year 
                                                 
10Correlation coefficients between the other measures are modest.  The next highest 
correlation is between assets and leverage (a coefficient of 0.106).   24
as described above, and normalize it by the total assets (in billions of 2002 dollars) of 
the firm. 
These univariate comparisons do not, of course, have any controls for industry 
characteristics.  To partially address this issue, I also undertake the comparisons for the 
subset of firms whose primary assignment is to SIC codes 60 through 64 and 67. 
 
  The table highlights that the fact that innovators tend to be larger and older.  They 
are less likely to be located in zip codes where there are many financial firms and 
financial innovations, a pattern that remains true even when I look at the subset of 
financial service firms.  Innovators are likely to have stronger academic ties.  The results 
regarding profitability (EBITDA margin) and leverage are mixed: the results in the 
sample as a whole are inconsistent or insignificant, but innovators are more profitable and 
more leveraged when only financial service firms are compared.  In any case, our 
interpretation of these results must be cautious.  Not only is the absence of controls for 
industry, time period, and company location troubling, but the observations are clearly 
not independent. 
 
Table 4 examines how the propensity to innovate varies with firm size.  I divide 
the firm-year observations into quartiles based on assets (expressed in 2002 dollars).  In 
the table, I present the number of innovations awarded in each year per billion dollars of 
assets (again in 2002 dollars) for each size quartile.  The greater propensity of smaller   25
firms to innovate is apparent.
11  Once again, though, our interpretation of the patterns 
must be cautious. 
 
 I address these concerns in Tables 5 through 7, which examine the determinants 
of innovations in a regression framework.  Following the template of Hausman, Hall, and 
Griliches (1984), I employ Poisson and negative binomial specifications.  Both are well 
suited for handling this type of non-negative integer dependent variable, though the 
negative binomial specification is frequently preferred due to its more flexible features.   
 
I address the panel nature of the data set in two ways.  First, I pool all 
observations, employing each observation separately (though computing heteroskedastic-
adjusted standard errors that reflect the presence of multiple observations for each firm).  
I then estimate random effects regressions, which essentially combine information from 
fixed effects regressions (which add a dummy variable for each firm) and within 
regressions (that use only one observation from each firm).   In the pooled regressions, I 
include dummy variables to control for the nation in which the company has its 
headquarters, its three-digit SIC code, and the year of the observation; in the random 
effects ones, I only control for the year (due to the presence of firm-level controls). 
 
                                                 
11These patterns—and those discussed below—continue to hold when I divide firms by 
employees rather than assets.  The ratio of the count of innovations to employees is 13.7 
times greater for the quartile of smallest firms than for the quartile of the largest firms.  
The ratio decreases monotonically with firm size: the ratio for the smallest firms is 5.8 
times greater than for the second largest quartile and 3.0 times greater than the third 
largest quartile.   26
Table 5 presents an analysis of the impact of firm size on innovation.  I use as 
observations three sets of firms: those with at least one Wall Street Journal innovation, 
those with at least five financial patents, and all firms with a primary assignment to 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes 60 through 64 and 67.
12  I first simply use 
the logarithm of size as an independent variable, and then employ a piece-wise 
specification.  In the latter case, four separate independent variables take on the value of 
the logarithm of size if size falls into that quartile, and zero otherwise. 
 
The size measures are consistently different from zero at the one-percent 
confidence level: larger firms, not surprisingly, are more innovative.  A natural question 
is whether the elasticity of innovations with respect to size is greater or less than one.  In 
other words, does a 10% increase in size lead to more or less than a 10% increase in 
innovations?  To examine this, I exponentiate the coefficients and subtract one: thus, a 
coefficient of 0.693 would translate into an elasticity of one.  The implied elasticities are 
consistently less than one, with the exception of the smallest-quartile firms in the second 
and fourth regressions.  In the final line, I test whether these differences from one are 
significant.  In seven out of eight regressions, the null hypothesis that the elasticity is 
equal to one can be rejected at the ten-percent confidence level; in five out of eight, it can 
be rejected at the five-percent level.  This finding of an elasticity of less than one can be 
contrasted with the consensus in the literature, which depicts innovation being undertaken 
disproportionately by the largest financial institutions (e.g., Tufano (2003)). 
 
                                                 
12The reason for using a higher cutoff for patenting is that there were many more such 
awards than innovations in our database.     27
In Tables 6 and 7, I estimate similar equations that examine the influence of the 
other proposed explanatory factors.  Each pair of columns in Table 6 is similar in 
structure.  In the first column, I report the results of six separate regressions, in which one 
of the additional independent variables is used along with a variety of control variables.
13  
In the second column, I report the result of a regression that employs all of the 
independent variables simultaneously (though, as noted above, I only use one of the two 
zip code-based measures).  In Table 7, I rerun the regressions reported in second column 
of these pairs (focusing on the negative binomial specifications) to explore the robustness 
of the results.  The reported regressions include those where (a) firms not based in the 
United States are eliminated, (b) only innovations ranked as particularly important (see 
the discussion in Section 2) are included,
14 (c) an additional control for R&D spending is 
added,
15 and (d) a correction is made to the regression specifications for the possible 
incidence of too many observations with no innovations.
16 
                                                 
13I employ the logarithm of all independent variables that are not ratios.   In order to 
include observations with a value of zero, I add one to each independent variable before 
taking the logarithm. 
 
14The reported results here use all innovations classified as “As” and “Bs.”  The results 
using only “As” are similar. 
 
15I assume that all firms that do not report R&D spending in their financial statements 
perform no R&D.  In point of fact, most financial services firms do not report R&D 
spending, even if they undertake substantial R&D (see Long (2003)).  98% of the firms in 
the sample with a primary assignment to the financial service industries do not report 
positive R&D.  For instance, neither Citigroup nor Merrill Lynch report any R&D 
between 1990 and 2002.  Thus, I must approach this measure with caution.  
 
16In addition, I undertake a variety of additional analyses that are not reported.  These 
including deleting firms that are not assigned to SIC codes 60 through 64 and 67, deleting 
trusts and real estate investment trusts, and weighting the observations to reflect whether 
the firm is the sole focus of the story or is featured alongside with other firms.  The 
results are little changed.   28
 
The key results of Table 6 and 7 are as follows: 
•  Older firms appear to be associated with more innovations in the first set of random 
effects regressions, but this result does not appear to be robust to modifications of the 
specification. 
•  Less profitable firms are consistently significantly more innovative.  In the second 
regression in Table 6, a one standard deviation increase in the ratio of EBITDA to 
sales translates into a 36% decline in the predicted rate of innovation. 
•  More levered firms are less innovative in the regressions with random effects; no 
such pattern appears in the pooled regressions.  This suggests that as individual firms 
become more levered, the rate of financial innovation is likely to decrease, but that 
this pattern does not appear in a cross-section of firms. 
•  More financial innovations occurring in a firm’s zip code are associated with less 
innovation in the random effects regressions. 
•  Closer ties to academia are consistently statistically associated with more innovation, 
though the magnitude of the effect is more modest.  In the second regression of Table 
6, a one standard deviation increase in the ratio of editorial board seats to assets leads 
to a 7% increase in the expected rate of innovation. 
 
4.  How Does Innovation Before and After State Street Differ? 
The second analysis examines changes associated with the dramatic shift in the 
ability to appropriate discoveries associated with the State Street decision.  While I can 
say little about how the decision affected the overall rate of financial innovation—the   29
pace of innovation may have been affected by many other considerations, such as tax 
policy and other regulatory shifts—I can examine whether the distribution of innovators 
was affected by the policy change. 
 
Table 8 summarizes regressions similar to those in the fourth and eighth columns 
of Table 5 and the fourth and eighth column of Table 6.  (Once again, I focus on the 
negative binomial estimations.)  In this estimate, I include a second set of independent 
variables, which consist of interactions between the key independent variables of interest 
and a dummy variable denoting if the observation is from the year 2000 or after.  In Panel 
A, I report the coefficients and the associated t-statistics of the interaction terms.  In 
Panel B, I report the implied coefficients before and after 2000. 
 
The clearest pattern to emerge from the table is the substantial increase in the 
coefficient on assets in the post-State Street era.  The implied elasticities prior to 2000 are 
all less than one (consistent with the analysis in Table 5).  In 2000 and after, however, the 
elasticities are (in all but one reported case and the overwhelming majority of the 
unreported ones) greater than one.  In many cases, the differences from one are 
statistically significant. 
 
The results regarding the other independent variables are weaker.  The one result 
worth commenting on is the apparent decline in the significance of the ratio of editorial 
board seats to assets.  Rather than being positive, as is the case before 2000 and in the 
regressions reported above, the coefficient is now negative in both reported regressions.    30
In one case, the interaction term is significant at the five-percent confidence level.  Our 
interpretation of this result must be cautious, as in the other reported regression (and in 
many of the unreported ones), the interaction term is not statistically significant. 
 
It is important to pause to emphasize the importance of caution when interpreting 
the results.  Even if the coefficients are significant, the change may not have been caused 
by the State Street decision.  Moreover, many of the effects of financial patenting may 
not make themselves felt for years to come.  In addition, the modest number of 
observations after the State Street decision implies that any changes are likely to be 
observed with considerable imprecision.
17 
 
The final set of analyses examines the filing of patent applications by the firms in 
our sample.  I replicate the analyses above, in the hopes of getting a better understanding 
of causes of the changes seen above.  If the patterns in patenting mirror the changes seen 
in recent years in the nature of financial innovations, I may be more confident in 
attributing the changes to this policy shift. 
 
Table 9 repeats the analysis in Table 3, now comparing the features of all firms 
with five or more financial patent awards between 1990 and 2002 and all firms with a 
                                                 
17The need for caution in the interpretation of this analysis is also underscored by an 
examination of the coefficients from (unreported) annual regressions of the number of 
innovations on firm size (using the controls above).  While the coefficients on firm size 
are the highest during the period 2000 to 2002, and there is a sharp discontinuity between 
1999 and 2000, the coefficient is quite unstable from year-to-year.  In addition, the 
influence of other aspects of the economic environment is apparent: for instance, the 
coefficient is particularly low in 1998 and 1999, apparently due to the large number of 
stories on smaller firms that had recently raised venture financing or gone public.   31
primary assignment to the financial services industry.  As before, each firm-year pair is 
used as a distinct observation (and assumed to be independent).  
 
Similar to the analysis of innovators, patentees tend to be larger and older.  They 
are less likely to be located in zip codes where there are many financial firms and 
financial innovations, a pattern that remains true even when I look at the subset of 
financial service firms.  Unlike the analysis of innovators, stronger academic ties are only 
weakly associated with more patents.  As above, the results regarding profitability and 
leverage are mixed: the results are inconsistent or insignificant.   
 
Table 10 replicates the analysis in Table 4, examining how the propensity to 
innovate and patent varies with firm size.  Again, I divide the firm-year observations into 
quartiles based on assets (expressed in 2002 dollars).  In the table, I present the number of 
patents awarded in each year per billion dollars of assets (again in 2002 dollars) for each 
size quartile.  The greater propensity of smaller firms to patent is apparent, though the 
magnitude of the effect is somewhat smaller here than in Table 4. 
 
I then turn to examining patenting in a regression framework.  A general 
consensus in the productivity literature is that it makes sense to examine the filing date of 
patent applications, rather then their award dates.  The processing times for these awards 
differ across time and technology classes.  Moreover, studies suggest that the lag between 
the patent application filing and the R&D activity is minimal (Hall, Griliches, and 
Hausman (1986)).  While this approach is certainly desirable, it has the consequence of   32
limiting the time period over which I can examine patenting behavior.  Applications are 
often held confidential in the United States prior to award, so I cannot ascertain how 
many applications each firm has made in recent years.  I consequentially restrict the 
analysis to patents applied for prior to 2000. 
 
Table 11 corresponds to the analyses of innovations in the Panels A of Tables 5 
and 6.   Panel A of Table 11 highlights the fact that the elasticity of patenting with respect 
to size is typically well less than one, a difference that is generally both economically and 
statistically meaningful.  Panel B reveals both some similarities with and differences 
from the patterns seen among innovations.  Like the innovators, patentees tend to be less 
profitable.  Unlike them, however, they tend to be less likely to have an academic 
affiliation.  In addition, patentees appear to be significantly less leveraged, a pattern 
found in some of the innovation regressions.  The results remain robust when other 
specifications (e.g., akin to those in Panels B of Tables 5 and 6) are used. 
 
 
The analysis of patenting is intended to be exploratory, and my conclusions must 
of necessity be tentative.  Certainly, I cannot attribute the increased elasticity of 
innovation with respect to firm size after 1999 to any difference in the nature of firms 
seeking patent protection.  It may well be, however, that the value of these patents are 
greater for larger firms (perhaps due to their greater ability to enforce these awards 
(Lerner (1995))).  But the increased elasticity could also reflect other, totally unrelated 
changes.  It is also tempting to relate the seeming decline in the importance of academic   33
ties in spurring innovation to the lesser importance of this activity as a determinant of 
patenting, but this claim again would be beyond what the evidence would support. 
 
5.  Conclusions   
In this paper, I analyze the sources of financial innovations between 1990 and 
2002.  I find evidence that suggests that small firms are as innovative or even more 
innovative than their larger peers.  Less profitable firms and those with stronger ties to 
academia also innovate more.  Recent evidence suggests that these relationships may be 
changing after the State Street decision, which greatly encouraged financial patenting. 
 
This paper is very much of an initial look at these issues.  Far more could be done 
to relate changes in the rate and type of innovations to shifts in the tax, regulatory, and 
overall economic environment.  In order to fully explore these issues, it will probably be 
necessary to look over a longer time frame.  A second area that would reward exploration 
is tracing out how these breakthroughs affected the profitability and growth of the 
innovators and their competitors.     34
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Appendix A: Summary of Patent Policy Changes 
 
 
The fervent in the U.S. patent system—and in financial patents in particular—had its 
origin in two shifts.  Neither was thoroughly discussed at the time.  Nor did policymakers 
appear to appreciate the interaction between these two changes: 
 
•  The first was a seemingly technical shift in the appellate process.  Since the birth of the 
republic, almost all formal disputes involving patents have been tried in the federal 
judicial system.  The initial litigation must occur in a district court.  Before 1982, 
appeals of patent cases were heard in the appellate courts of the various circuits.  These 
circuits differed considerably in their interpretation of patent law, with some of them 
more than twice as likely to uphold patent claims than others.  These differences 
persisted because the Supreme Court rarely heard patent-related cases.   In 1982, the 
U.S. Congress established a centralized appellate court for patent cases:  the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC).  The CAFC was staffed mostly with judges in 
the federal system that had experience as patent attorneys.  Not surprisingly, many had 
an outlook that was sympathetic to the patent system.  Over the next decade, in case 
after case, the court significantly broadened patent-holders’ rights.  The court expanded 
patent-holders’ rights along a number of other dimensions as well.   
 
•  The operation of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) itself also changed 
over this period.  Over the course of the 1990s, Congress converted the PTO from a 
tax-revenue-funded agency that collected nominal fees for patent applications into 
one funded solely by fees.  Indeed, the PTO has become a “profit center” for the 
government, collecting more in application fees than it costs to run the agency.  These 
effects of this policy change has been severe financial pressures, particularly in 
emerging industries.  Consequently, awards of patents in several critical new 
technologies have been delayed and highly inconsistent.   
 
With this background, I will now turn the specifics of financial and business 
method patents.  Since the early days of the twentieth century, there has been 
considerable doubt as to whether methods of doing business fell under the definition of 
patentable subject matter, namely “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter.”
1  While the United Sates did not explicitly forbid business 
method patents, as many countries did, there was still a presumption that they did not fall 
into these four categories and hence were not patentable.
2 
 
                                                 
135 U.S.C. 101.  
2The crucial decision in establishing such an exception was Hotel Security Checking Co. 
v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467 (2d Cir. 1908), which concerned a restaurant bookkeeping 
system.    39
This presumption changed with the CAFC’s July 1998 decision in State Street 
Bank & Trust v. Signature Financial Group.
3  State Street Bank sued to have Signature’s 
1993 patent on software to fix closing prices of mutual funds for reporting purposes 
declared invalid.  While State Street’s argument prevailed in the Federal District of 
Massachusetts, where a summary judgment of patent invalidity was issued.  The CAFC 
reversed the decision on appeal.  In its decision, the appellate court explicitly rejected the 
notion that there was a “business method” exception for patentability.  Rather, the CAFC 
stated “the question of whether a claim encompasses statutory subject matter should not 
focus on which of the four categories of subject matter a claim is directed to … but rather 
on the essential characteristics of the subject matter, in particular, its practical utility.”
4  
State Street’s certiorari petition to the Supreme Court, asking them to review this 
decision, was rejected in January 1999. 
 
Assessing the extent to which this decision has affected firm behavior is difficult.  
Certainly, financial patents have issued for many years.  (The patent issued to Merrill 
Lynch in 1982 for its cash management account was one highly publicized example.)  
But interviews that Peter Tufano and I have conducted suggest that the State Street 
decision has spurred many financial institutions to reconsider their policies regarding 
patenting.  Certainly, the volume of financial patent applications has increased 
dramatically (Lerner (2002)).  An examination of the financial patents that issued both 
before and after the State Street decision underscores many of the issues regarding 
examination quality discussed above.  Numerous examples exist of patents covering 
“discoveries” that actually have been known for many years.   
                                                 
 
3149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 
4State Street, 149 F.3d at 1375.  
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Appendix B: Examples of Included Stories 
 
 
•  Announcements of new financial products and processes. 
 
•  Announcements of new products incorporating an improvement. 
 
•  Plans to develop or introduce new products or processes. 
 
•  Experimental new products. 
 
•  Joint ventures if an innovation is mentioned as the goal. 
 
•  Government grants and contracts to fund something new and innovative (even if 
government is only seeking to award a contract).  (Unlike for new products and 
processes, for grants and contracts I required that there must be some clear 
evidence that something innovative is sought):  
 
•  Government approvals (or applications for approval) of new products, including 
approvals by foreign governments. 
 
•  Innovative new applications or combinations of existing product. 
 
•  Applications of new technology to finance: “High-yield junk bonds auctioned 
electronically.” 
 
•  Articles about innovation even if it concerned only the intention to surpass some 
technological hurdle.  My reasoning is that an invention or innovation probably 
spurred the attempt.  The fact that the research may ultimately fail is not a 
concern, as even many patented inventions turn out to be useless. 
 
•  Innovative applications on the Internet: “First application of online banking.”  I 
do not include announcements of new web pages unless there is a clear 
innovation, i.e., the first application of a new idea.   41
Appendix C: Examples of Excluded Stories 
 
•  Cases in which marketing issues are central and technological achievements only 
secondary. 
 
•  Reports on the spread or diffusion of an existing technology. 
 
•  Expansion of a market: “Branch banking to hit Hawaii.” 
 
•  Letters to the editor, editorials, or corrections. 
 
•  Political decisions, new laws, and regulations.  (But patents issued and 
government approvals of new products are included.) 
 
•  Articles concerning standards, even if they are technological standards. 
 
•  New design or product in which the improvement is clearly esthetic rather than 
technological. 
 
•  Government grants or contracts for production of an existing product, or one that 
is not clearly innovative. 
 
•  New products or innovations occurring in foreign markets, which have no 
consequences for U.S. producers or consumers.  
 
•  New issues of stocks or bonds where the security types. 
 
•  Patent infringement cases or stories about licensing technology.  These cases 
concern ownership of intellectual property, not its creation. 
 
•  New scientific discoveries.  Here, the discovery does not point to a specific new 
product or process; if it had, I would include it.   42
Table 1.  Summary of stories about innovations.  The table provides information on the distribution of news stories about financial innovations in the 
Wall Street Journal.  Panel A presents the breakdown of all news stories by year.  Panel B provides a breakdown of the types of innovation.  Panel C 
tabulates the mentions of Compustat-listed entities in these stories by year.   Panel D presents the distribution of the firms in Panel C by their primary 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code (at the three-digit level). 
 
Panel A: Total     Panel B: Breakdown of    Panel C: Mentions of Compustat-    Panel D: Distribution of Compustat- 
Stories by Year    Innovation Types    Listed Entities by Year    Listed Innovators by 3-Digit SIC Code 
1990  48    Security underwriting; trading  33.5%    1990  27    Securities brokers & dealers (621)  23.5% 
1991  61    Asset management; pensions  26.2%    1991  32    Commercial banks (602)  22.3% 
1992  47    Combination of classes; other   17.7%    1992  30    Other non-depository credit insts. (619)  8.2% 
1993  49    Retail/mortgage banking  11.6%    1993  22    Computer programming & related (737)  6.7% 
1994  38  Credit  cards  5.2%   1994  28   Books  (273)  4.4% 
1995  29  Insurance  5.2%   1995  18   Newspapers  (271)  3.5% 
1996  34    Commercial banking  0.6%    1996  21    Motor vehicles & equipment (371)  2.9% 
1997  54       1997  40   Miscellaneous  business  services  (738)  2.6% 
1998  49          1998  16    Fire, marine & casualty insurance (633)  2.1% 
1999  55       1999  40   Petroleum  refining  (291)  2.1% 
2000  74       2000  46   Telephone  (481)  2.1% 
2001  55       2001  25   Life  insurance  (631)  1.8% 




   43
Table 2.  Most frequently represented Compustat-listed innovators and patentees.  The table lists 
those firms who had the greatest number of Wall Street Journal stories about innovations and patent 
awards between 1990 and 2002 while listed in Compustat. 
 
Panel A: Innovators    Panel B: Patentees 
Company Name  Number    Company Name  Number 
Merrill Lynch  20    Hitachi  76 
Citigroup  15    International Business Machines  55 
American Express  13    NCR  55 
Citicorp 13    Citigroup  47 
McGraw-Hill 13    Fujitsu  47 
Charles Schwab Corp.  11    AT&T  33 
Dow Jones   10    Diebold  30 
Morgan Stanley  10    Toshiba  23 
Goldman Sachs  9    Merrill Lynch  18 
Bear Stearns  8    First Data  14 
International Business Machines  8    Citicorp  13 
Reuters Group  7    Microsoft  12 
Bank of America  6    Xerox  12 
Barclays  6    Electronic Data Systems  10 
Chase Manhattan   6    Lucent  10 
J P Morgan   6    Reuters Group  10 
   Unisys  10 
 
NOTE: These tabulations are based on the assignment to the Compustat GVKEY code, which typically 
continues with a firm even as it changes its name.  Thus, Citigroup includes activity by Citigroup after the 1998 
merger and by the Travelers Group (and predecessor entities) previously.  Citicorp includes activity by Citicorp 
prior to the 1998 merger. 
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Table 3.  Characteristics of innovators and other financial firms.  The sample consists of 20,916 annual 
observations of financial innovators and other financial service firms listed in Compustat between 1990 
and 2002.  The first column summarizes the characteristics of all firms with a primary assignment to the 
financial service industry.  The second and third present the characteristics for all firms undertaking at 
least one financial innovation (reported in the Wall Street Journal) and all innovators who had a primary 
assignment to the financial service industry.  The results of t- and median tests comparing these firms to 
other financial services firms are also presented. 
 
  All Financial  Innovators 
  Service Firms  All Firms  Financial Service Only 
Assets      
   Mean  10,899  90,112***  132,304*** 
   Median  516  28,693***  57,115*** 
Years since IPO       
   Mean  8.6  21.4***  18.7*** 
   Median  6  16***  18*** 
EBITDA Margin       
   Mean  0.18  0.24***  0.32*** 
   Median  0.28  0.23***  0.31*** 
Leverage      
   Mean  0.28  0.29  0.33*** 
   Median  0.21  0.26***  0.31*** 
Other Financial Firms in Zip Code       
   Mean  294  194***  153*** 
   Median  3  2***  2*** 
Financial Innovations in Zip Code       
   Mean  2.46  1.76***  1.40*** 
   Median  0  0***  0*** 
Editorial Board Seats/Assets Ratio       
   Mean  0.0005  0.0031***  0.0034*** 
   Median  0  0***  0*** 
 
* = significant at the 10% confidence level; ** = significant at the 5% level; *** = significant at the 1% level.   45
Table 4.  Distribution of innovations across firm size quartiles.  The sample consists of 20,916 annual 
observations of financial innovators and other financial service firms listed in Compustat between 1990 
and 2002.  The table divides the firm-year observations based on assets (in 2002 dollars) in the year of 
the observation.  The table then reports the average annual number of innovations per billion dollars of 
assets (also in 2002 dollars). 
  
Asset Size Quartile  Number of Firm-Year Observations  Innovations/Assets ($B 2002) 
Under $148.27 million  5210  0.0389 
Between $148.27 and $554.70 million  5211  0.0058 
Between $554.71 and $2,487.26 million  5211  0.0043 
Over $2,487.26 million  5210  0.0012 
p-Value, F-test of difference    0.022   46
Table 5.  Regression analyses of the impact of firm size on innovative activity.  The sample consists of 20,916 annual observations of financial innovators, 
financial patentees, and other financial service firms listed in Compustat between 1990 and 2002.   The regressions employ pooled observations or random 
effects, with a Poisson or negative binomial specification.  The dependent variable in each regression is the count of innovations by a given firm in a given 
year.   The independent variables are the logarithm of assets (in millions of 2002 dollars) or the logarithm of assets if the observation is in each quartile.  
Additional control variables in the pooled regressions (not reported) include dummies for the location of the company, the three-digit Standard Industrial 
Classification class of the firm, and the year of the observation; the random effects regressions employ the year dummies.  Standard errors (heteroskedastic-
adjusted in the pooled regressions) are in parentheses. 
 
  Panel A: Pooled Regressions    Panel B: Random Effects Regressions 
  Poisson  Negative Binomial    Poisson  Negative Binomial 
Logarithm  of  assets  0.57   0.60     0.60     0.62  
  ***(0.07)   ***(0.06)     ***(0.04)     ***(0.04)  
Log of assets if assets are in smallest  quartile   0.71   0.83     0.56     0.63 
   ***(0.27)   ***(0.25)     ***(0.17)     ***(0.17) 
Log of assets if assets are in second quartile   0.53   0.61     0.41     0.44 
   ***(0.20)   ***(0.18)     ***(0.12)     ***(0.12) 
Log of assets if assets are in third quartile   0.55   0.62     0.46     0.49 
   ***(0.16)   ***(0.15)     ***(0.09)     ***(0.09) 
Log of assets if assets are in largest quartile   0.57   0.62     0.54     0.56 
   ***(0.11)   ***(0.10)     ***(0.06)     ***(0.06) 
Location  dummy  variables  Y Y  Y Y   N N    N N 
SIC code dummy variables  Y  Y  Y  Y    N  N    N  N 
Year  dummy  variables  Y Y  Y Y   Y Y    Y Y 
   Number of observations  20,821  20,821  20,821  20,821    20,821  20,821    20,821  20,821 
   Log likelihood  -1070.6  -1069.3  -1044.8  -1043.1    -1144.0  -1140.8    -1138.3  -1135.1 
   p-Value, chi-squared test  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00    0.00  0.00    0.00  0.00 
   p-Value, F-test of equality of coefficients     0.385    0.207      0.100      0.091 
   p-Value, test of equality of elasticity to 1   0.086  0.007  0.133  0.007    0.021  0.010    0.058  0.020 
  
* = significant at the 10% confidence level; ** = significant at the 5% level; *** = significant at the 1% level.   47
Table 6.  Regression analyses of the other independent variables on innovative activity.  The sample consists of 20,916 annual observations of financial 
innovators, financial patentees, and other financial service firms listed in Compustat between 1990 and 2002.   The regressions employ pooled observations or 
random effects, with a Poisson or negative binomial specification.  The dependent variable in each regression is the count of innovations by a given firm in a 
given year.   The independent variables include the logarithm of years since the firm’s initial public offering, the ratio of its earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization to revenues, the ratio of the book value of the firm’s long-term debt to total capitalization (the book value of its long-term debt 
and preferred stock plus the market value of its common stock), the logarithm of the number of financial firms based in the firm’s zip code, the logarithm of 
the number of financial innovations in that year by other companies based in the firm’s zip code, and the ratio of the firm’s editorial board seats on 
academic-practitioner journals to assets.  Additional control variables in the pooled regressions (not reported) include the logarithm of assets and dummies 
for the location of the company, the three-digit Standard Industrial Classification class of the firm, and the year of the observation; the random effects 
regressions employ assets and the year dummies.  The first column of each pair represents the coefficients from six separate regressions using each 
independent variable in turn; the second column reports the coefficients from a single regression.  Standard errors (heteroskedastic-adjusted in the pooled 
regressions) are in parentheses. 
 
  Panel A: Pooled Regressions    Panel B: Random Effects Regressions 
  Poisson  Negative Binomial    Poisson  Negative Binomial 
Log of years since firm’s IPO  0.10  0.10  0.12  0.10    0.27  0.20    0.26  0.19 
  (0.08) (0.10)  (0.08) (0.10)    ***(0.08)  **(0.10)    ***(0.08)  **(0.10) 
EBITDA/revenues ratio  -0.67 -0.65  -0.71 -0.72   -0.64 -0.65    -0.64 -0.65 
  ***(0.17) ***(0.22)  ***(0.14) ***(0.17)  ***(0.13) ***(0.16)    ***(0.13)  ***  (0.17) 
Leverage ratio  -0.47 -0.45  -0.64 -0.51   -1.42 -1.38    -1.32 -1.24 
  (0.58) (0.57)  (0.61) (0.59)    ***(0.37)  ***(0.40)    ***(0.38)  ***(0.40) 
Log of financial firms based in zip code   -0.02   -0.002     -0.11     -0.12  
  (0.05)   (0.05)     ***(0.04)     ***(0.04)  
Log of financial innovations by others in zip code  -0.14  -0.09  -0.09  -0.04    -0.38  -0.43    -0.41  -0.46 
  (0.14) (0.16)  (0.14) (0.15)    ***(0.10)  ***(0.12)    ***(0.10)  ***(0.12) 
Editorial board seats/assets ratio  0.03 0.08  0.04 0.08   0.04 0.10    0.04 0.11 
  ***(0.005) ***(0.01)  ***(0.01) ***(0.01)  ***(0.02) ***(0.03)    ***(0.02) ***(0.03) 
Logarithm  of  assets  Y Y  Y Y   Y Y  Y Y 
Location dummy variables  Y  Y  Y  Y    N  N    N  N 
SIC code dummy variables  Y  Y  Y  Y    N  N    N  N 
Year dummy variables  Y  Y  Y  Y    Y  Y    Y  Y 
   Number of observations  NA  15,937  NA  15,937    NA  15,937    NA  15,937 
   Log likelihood  NA  -873.9  NA  -849.7    NA  -908.6    NA  -903.1 
   p-Value, chi-squared test  NA  0.00  NA  0.00    NA  0.00    NA  0.00 
  
* = significant at the 10% confidence level; ** = significant at the 5% level; *** = significant at the 1% level. 
 
NA = not applicable (column consists of coefficients from multiple regressions, rather than a single regression).   48
Table 7.  Robustness of the results.  The sample consists of 20,916 annual observations of financial innovators, financial patentees, and other financial service 
firms listed in Compustat between 1990 and 2002.   The regressions employ pooled observations or random effects, with a negative binomial specification 
(except for the last regression, which employs a Poisson specification).  The dependent variable in each regression is the count of innovations by a given firm 
in a given year.   The independent variables include the logarithm of years since the firm’s initial public offering, the ratio of its earnings before interest, 
taxes, depreciation and amortization to revenues, the ratio of the book value of the firm’s long-term debt to total capitalization (the book value of its long-
term debt and preferred stock plus the market value of its common stock), the logarithm of the number of financial firms based in the firm’s zip code, the 
logarithm of the number of financial innovations in that year by other companies based in the firm’s zip code, and the ratio of the firm’s editorial board seats 
on academic-practitioner journals to assets.  Additional control variables in the pooled regressions (not reported) include the logarithm of assets (in millions 
of 2002 dollars), dummies for the location of the company, the three-digit Standard Industrial Classification class of the firm, and the year of the observation; 
the random effects regression employs assets and the year dummies.  The first pair of regressions eliminate firms not based in the United States; the second 
pair only use discoveries ranked as highly innovative; the third pair adds the ratio of R&D to assets as a control variable; and the final pair employs an 
adjustment for extra zeros in the sample.  Standard errors (heteroskedastic-adjusted in the pooled regressions) are in parentheses. 
 
  Negative Binomial Specification  Poisson 
  Eliminating non-US  firms  “Good” innovations    R&D control    Zero adjustment 
  Pooled Rand.  eff.  Pooled  Rand.eff.    Pooled Rand.eff.    Pooled Pooled 
Log of years since firm’s IPO  0.06  0.10  0.03  0.14    0.10  0.19    0.14  0.14 
  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.12) (0.11)   (0.10)  **(0.10)    (0.10) (0.12) 
EBITDA/revenues ratio  -0.78  -0.73  -0.88 -0.68   -0.72 -0.65    -0.80 -0.74 
  ***(0.16)  ***(0.16)  ***(0.16) ***(0.18)   ***(0.17) ***(0.17)    ***(0.21) ***(0.24) 
Leverage ratio  -0.19  -1.00  -0.69 -1.46   -0.51 -1.24    -0.81 -0.68 
  (0.64)  **(0.41)  (0.68) ***(0.48)    (0.59) ***(0.40)    (0.77)  (0.67) 
Log of financial innovations by others  in  zip  code -0.08  -0.46  -0.03 -0.43   -0.04 -0.46    -1.35 -1.27 
  (0.15)  ***(0.13)  (0.17) ***(0.14)    (0.15) ***(0.12)   **(0.60) ***(0.50) 
Editorial board seats/assets ratio  0.08  0.11  0.08 0.11   0.08 0.11    0.09 0.08 
  ***(0.01)  ***(0.03)  ***(0.01) ***(0.03)   ***(0.01) ***(0.03)    ***(0.01) ***(0.01) 
R&D/assets  ratio           0.12 0.13       
           ***(0.03)  (0.10)      
Logarithm  of  assets  Y  Y  Y Y   Y Y    Y Y 
Location  dummy  variables  N  N  Y N   Y N    Y Y 
SIC  code  dummy  variables  Y  N  Y N   Y N    Y Y 
Year  dummy  variables  Y  Y  Y Y   Y Y    Y Y 
   Number of observations  15,034  15,034  15,937  15,937    15,937  15,937    9,951  9,951 
   Log likelihood  -775.2  -816.9  -634.8  -693.3    -849.6  -902.9    -624.6  -636.4 
      p-Value,  chi-squared  test  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00   0.00 0.00    0.00 0.00 
 
* = significant at the 10% confidence level; ** = significant at the 5% level; *** = significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 8.  Regression analysis of the impact of firm characteristics on innovative activity with interaction 
terms for observations after the State Street decision.  The sample consists of 20,916 annual observations 
of financial innovators, financial patentees, and other financial service firms listed in Compustat between 
1990 and 2002.  The regressions employ pooled observations or random effects, with a negative binomial 
specification.  The dependent variable in each regression is the count of innovations by a given firm in a 
given year.   The independent variables in the first and third regressions are the logarithm of assets (in 
millions of 2002 dollars) if the observation is in each asset quartile (not reported) and interactions 
between these terms and a dummy denoting if the observation is in 2000 or after.  The independent 
variables in the second and fourth regressions include the logarithm of years since the firm’s initial 
public offering, the ratio of its earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization to revenues, 
the ratio of the book value of the firm’s long-term debt to total capitalization (the book value of its long-
term debt and preferred stock plus the market value of its common stock), the logarithm of the number 
of financial firms based in the firm’s zip code, the logarithm of the number of financial innovations in 
that year by other companies based in the firm’s zip code, the ratio of the firm’s editorial board seats on 
academic-practitioner journals to assets (all not reported), and interactions between these terms and a 
dummy denoting if the observation is in 2000 or after.  Additional control variables in the pooled 
regressions (not reported) include the logarithm of assets (in the second regression only), dummies for 
the location of the company, the three-digit Standard Industrial Classification class of the firm, and the 
year of the observation; the random effect regressions employ assets (in the fourth regression only) and 
the year dummies. Standard errors (heteroskedastic-adjusted in the pooled regressions) are in 
parentheses.  Panel B reports the coefficients implied by the regressions for the periods before 2000 and 
2000 and after. 
 
Panel A: Interactions Terms in Negative Binomial Regressions 
  Pooled Regressions    Random Effects 
Log of assets if assets are in smallest quartile  0.61    0.62   
  **(0.30)  *(0.35)  
Log of assets if assets are in second quartile  0.35   0.38  
  (0.29)   (0.25)  
Log of assets if assets are in third quartile  0.49   0.46  
  **(0.21)   ***(0.16)  
Log of assets if assets are in largest quartile  0.27   0.28  
  **(0.12)   ***(0.08)  
Log of years since firm’s IPO    -0.04    -0.16 
   (0.16)   (0.15) 
EBITDA/revenues ratio   -0.43   -0.56 
   (0.27)    *(0.33) 
Leverage ratio   0.17   0.13 
   (0.75)   (0.65) 
Log of financial innovations by others in zip code    0.06    0.14 
   (0.28)   (0.23) 
Editorial board seats/assets ratio    -1.11    -0.35 
   **(0.46)    (3.90) 
Logarithm of assets     Y    Y 
Location dummy variables  Y  Y  N  N 
SIC code dummy variables  Y  Y  N  N 
Year dummy variables  Y  Y  Y  Y 
   Number of observations  20,821  15,937  20,821  15,937 
   Log likelihood  -1038.2  -848.1  -1128.7  -898.6 
   p-Value, chi-squared test  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Panel B: Implied Coefficients in Above Regressions 
  Pooled Regressions    Random Effects 
Log of assets if assets are in smallest quartile         
   Pre 2000  0.63    0.40   
   2000 and after  1.24    1.02     50
Log of assets if assets are in second quartile       
   Pre 2000  0.48    0.29   
   2000 and after  0.83    0.67   
Log of assets if assets are in third quartile       
   Pre 2000  0.46    0.34   
   2000 and after  0.95    0.80   
Log of assets if assets are in largest quartile       
   Pre 2000  0.53    0.47   
   2000 and after  0.80    0.75   
Log of years since firm’s IPO         
   Pre 2000    0.12    0.24 
   2000 and after    0.08    0.08 
EBITDA/revenues ratio       
   Pre 2000    -0.52    -0.42 
   2000 and after    -0.94    -0.98 
Leverage ratio       
   Pre 2000    -0.55    -1.28 
   2000 and after    -0.38    -1.16 
Financial innovations by others in zip code         
   Pre 2000    -0.05    -0.50 
   2000 and after    0.01    -0.36 
Editorial board seats/assets ratio         
   Pre 2000    0.08    0.10 
   2000 and after    -1.03    -0.25 
 
* = significant at the 10% confidence level; ** = significant at the 5% level; *** = significant at the 1% level.   51
Table 9.  Characteristics of patentees and other financial firms.  The sample consists of 20,916 annual 
observations of financial patentees and other financial service firms listed in Compustat between 1990 
and 2002.  The first column summarizes the characteristics of all firms with a primary assignment to the 
financial service industry.  The second and third present the characteristics for all firms awarded five or 
more financial patents and those who had a primary assignment to the financial service industry.  The 
results of t- and median tests comparing these firms to other financial services firms are also presented. 
 
  All Financial  Patentees 
  Service Firms  All Firms  Financial Service Only 
Assets      
   Mean  10,899  76,348***  210,396*** 
   Median  516  30,572***  132,842*** 
Years since IPO       
   Mean  8.6  24.6***  30.0*** 
   Median  6  18***  25*** 
EBITDA Margin       
   Mean  0.18  0.17  0.37** 
   Median  0.28  0.17***  0.34*** 
Leverage      
   Mean  0.28  0.19***  0.37*** 
   Median  0.21  0.13***  0.38*** 
Other Financial Firms in Zip Code       
   Mean  294  192***  61*** 
   Median  3  1***  1*** 
Financial Innovations in Zip Code       
   Mean  2.46  1.89***  0.68*** 
   Median  0  0**  0*** 
Editorial Board Seats/Assets Ratio       
   Mean  0.0005  0.0007  0.0033 
   Median  0  0***  0*** 
 
* = significant at the 10% confidence level; ** = significant at the 5% level; *** = significant at the 1% level.   52
Table 10.  Distribution of patents across firm size quartiles.  The sample consists of 20,916 annual 
observations of financial patentees and other financial service firms listed in Compustat between 1990 
and 2002.  The table divides the firm-year observations based on assets (in 2002 dollars) in the year of 
the observation.  The table then reports the average annual number of patents per billion dollars of 
assets (also in  2002 dollars). 
  
Asset Size Quartile  Number of Firm-Year Observations  Patents/Assets ($B 2002) 
Under $148.27 million  5210  0.0467 
Between $148.27 and $554.70 million  5211  0.0127 
Between $554.71 and $2,487.26 million  5211  0.0079 
Over $2,487.26 million  5210  0.0024 
p-Value, F-test of difference    0.011   53
Table 11.  Regression analyses of the impact of firm size on patenting.  The sample consists of 15,961 
annual observations of financial innovators, financial patentees, and other financial service firms listed 
in Compustat between 1990 and 1999.   The regressions employ pooled observations, with a Poisson or 
negative binomial specification.  The dependent variable in each regression is the count of successful 
patent applications filed by a given firm in a given year.   The independent variables in Panel A are the 
logarithm of assets (in millions of 2002 dollars) or the logarithm of assets if the observation is in each 
quartile.  Additional control variables (not reported) include dummies for the location of the company, 
the three-digit Standard Industrial Classification class of the firm, and the year of the observation.  The 
independent variables in Panel B include the logarithm of years since the firm’s initial public offering, 
the ratio of its earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization to revenues, the ratio of the 
book value of the firm’s long-term debt to total capitalization (the book value of its long-term debt and 
preferred stock plus the market value of its common stock), the logarithm of the number of financial 
firms based in the firm’s zip code, the logarithm of the number of financial innovations in that year by 
other companies based in the firm’s zip code, and the ratio of the firm’s editorial board seats on 
academic-practitioner journals to assets.  Additional control variables (not reported) include the 
logarithm of assets and dummies for the location of the company, the three-digit Standard Industrial 
Classification class of the firm, and the year of the observation.  The first column of each pair in Panel B 
represents the coefficients from six separate regressions using each independent variable in turn; the 
second column reports the coefficients from a single regression.  Heteroskedastic-adjusted standard 
errors are in parentheses. 
 
Panel A: Analysis of Firm Size 
  Poisson Negative  Binomial 
Logarithm  of  assets  0.41   0.46  
  ***(0.08)   ***(0.09)  
Log of assets if assets are in smallest quartile    0.82    0.81 
   **(0.40)    (0.52) 
Log of assets if assets are in second quartile   0.73   0.66 
   **(0.32)    *(0.37) 
Log of assets if assets are in third quartile   0.58   0.49 
   **(0.27)    (0.31) 
Log of assets if assets are in largest quartile   0.53   0.54 
   ***(0.16)   ***(0.21) 
Location dummy variables  Y  Y  Y  Y 
SIC code dummy variables  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Year dummy variables  Y  Y  Y  Y 
   Number of observations  15,886  15,886  15,886  15,886 
   Log likelihood  -1160.4  -1151.7  -969.8  -963.2 
   p-Value, chi-squared test  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Panel B: Other Independent Variables 
  Poisson Negative  Binomial 
Log of years since firm’s IPO  -0.08  -0.01  -0.11  -0.08 
  (0.15) (0.17)  (0.10) (0.13) 
EBITDA/revenues ratio  -0.66 -0.79  -0.91 -0.91 
  ***(0.15) ***(0.21)  ***(0.18) ***(0.28) 
Leverage ratio  -1.93 -2.15  -1.76 -1.78 
  **(0.85) **(0.97)  **(0.76) **(0.81) 
Log of financial firms based in zip code   -0.06   -0.11  
  (0.10)   (0.07)  
Log of financial innovations by others in zip code  0.05  -0.01  -0.18  -0.08 
  (0.19) (0.24)  (0.19) (0.21) 
Editorial board seats/assets ratio  -0.36  -0.33  -0.39  -0.32 
 ***(0.13)  **(0.15)  ***(0.12)  ***(0.11) 
Logarithm  of  assets  Y Y  Y Y 
Location dummy variables  Y  Y  Y  Y   54
SIC code dummy variables  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Year dummy variables  Y  Y  Y  Y 
   Number of observations  NA  11,941  NA  11,941 
   Log likelihood  NA  -920.9  NA  -771.8 
   p-Value, chi-squared test  NA  0.00  NA  0.00 
 
* = significant at the 10% confidence level; ** = significant at the 5% level; *** = significant at the 1% level. 
  
NA = not applicable (column consists of coefficients from multiple regressions, rather than a single regression).  
 